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Methodology
Almost ten years since the onset of the Tunisian revolution, the country remains engulfed
in a series of democratic reforms drawing pressure from transitional justice groups and the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund. Amidst this pressure, economic inequality, one of the
catalysts of the revolution, has worsened, creating an even greater disparity between the wealthy
coastal area and the poor interior regions. Many Tunisians, particularly those from the interior
region, are dismayed by the outcome of the revolution and the continual transfer of power and
money between elites at the impoverished south's expense. Economic inequality was at the
forefront of the interior region's revolution, with the slogan, "freedom, work, and dignity,"
illustrating their major complaints with elitist corruption. While the revolution did give Tunisians
their freedom from the authoritarian regime, the region faces high unemployment and inequitable
access to resources, signaling that while freedom has come, work and dignity lag behind. Almost
a decade later, these same issues continue to dominate the forefront of the interior region's
complaints. The Afrobarometer surveyed Tunisian youth in 2020 and found that 43% believe
that both unemployment and management of the economy are the most pressing problems their
government must address.
However, the government’s current approach ignores the plight of the interior region by
instead adopting structural and economic adjustments encouraged by international actors.
Despite a political upheaval only just a decade ago and the new promise of democracy, Tunisians
have grown politically apathetic and have even begun to mistrust the democratic institutions they
advocated for years prior. These Tunisians, mainly from the country's interior region, have
become rightly disillusioned with the government since they have seen little change, particularly
in terms of economic inequality or job opportunities, the reason they first turned to democracy.
This disillusionment is evidenced by significantly low voter turnout in the interior region,
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particularly among the youngest voters, and polls indicating a great mistrust and dissatisfaction
with the country’s political future. As a result, Tunisia’s successful and long-lasting transition to
democracy is teetering at the brink of another revolution. Quantitative data from the
Afrobarometer shows that only 46% of people polled prefer democracy over any other form of
government. Over 79% say that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Tunisia’s
government has chosen to ignore the lessons from democratic consolidation and post-soviet
transition theory and instead listens to international financial institutions such as the IMF or
World Bank, who have encouraged them to prioritize free-market restructuring. Thus, without
full government or international support, transitional justice has failed to answer some of the
most pressing inequities. This raises the question of why the Tunisian government has failed to
address economic inequality, particularly through their transitional justice process, and why they
have instead pursued austerity measures put in place by the World Bank and IMF.
Data from the Afrobarometer clearly illustrates that a significant percentage of Tunisians
are also worried about the direction of the country, and in stark contrast to the democratic
yearnings of the revolution, less than 50% of those surveyed prefer democracy. The
Afrobarometer’s data can be seen beyond the polls through mass protests rejecting privatization
and neoliberal economic reform. In turn, the regime led by political elites from the former Ben
Ali and Bourguiba regimes have continued to follow the guidance of the IMF and World Bank,
which has failed to address high unemployment and has only increased the cost of living. There
is a significant discord between what Tunisian civil society believes is most important in the
transition—economic inequality—and what the political elite and Western Banking Institutions
advocate—neoliberal economic reform. The majority of Tunisians surveyed are worried about
the state of the economy and its growing inequality. Yet, the Tunisian government has done little
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to address this inequality despite it being one of the leading causes of the revolution. The
Tunisian government's failure to address its people's economic concerns has led to a lack of
confidence in the country's future.
Tunisia’s democratization process is undergoing two monumental changes
simultaneously even before the first mass suffrage election for president —the creation of a new
political system and a dramatic economic restructuring. Democratization theory raises the
question of whether Tunisia can undergo both political and economic transformation while still
maintaining mass support for the democratic regime. Theories of democratic consolidation argue
that democratization processes are threatened if a country in transition is undertaking both
political and economic restructuring.1. For example, democratic consolidation theory argues that
a country cannot attempt economic restructuring without first having established political
institutions respected by the majority of the population. This is even more of a threat if the public
is dissatisfied with the overall political processes since a positive opinion could work as a buffer
to economic upheaval. Linz and Stepan argue that a democracy is not consolidated if a majority
of the public is unhappy with the economic and political future of a country. They draw on past
cases of democracy promotion to critique the belief that economic reform and market
liberalization will create a consolidated democracy. Linz and Stepan write that pursuing
economic reform will create painful restructuring that will, at first, economically hurt many
people. Thus, they must have well-established and trusted political institutions. Otherwise, they
will be unable to see the rationale for economic. In turn, Linz and Stepan believe that if

1

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” In Debates on
Democratization, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Philip Costopoulos, 3-19.
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010.
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democratization occurs at the same time as economic reform, there will be significant public
dissatisfaction with the direction of the country. Therefore, Linz and Stepan argue that
democratization cannot coincide with economic restructuring. As a result, these political
scientists believe that privatization and market reform cannot happen without first addressing the
need to create strong democratic institutions.
Despite democratization theory illustrating that a country cannot assume both political
and economic restructuring at the same time, the Tunisian government expects successful
democratization through austerity measures enforced by the IMF and World Bank while not
currently possessing strong democratic institutions. Democracy promotion theory and its critique
argue that Western Banking Institutions take advantage of developing countries, particularly
those in transition who need monetary aid and foreign recognition, by offering loans with strings
attached requiring neoliberal reform even if it is not in the best interest of the country. Former
leader, Bourguiba, set Tunisia on a course towards neoliberal reform by establishing a
relationship with the IMF in 1958. This relationship forced Tunisia to implement neoliberal
reforms. They continue to remain indebted to the IMF, meaning that they cannot sever this
relationship without having the funds to pay off their debt. Similarly, Tunisian presidents have
expressed an importance in reforming and privatizing their economy to spur foreign investment
and even argue that it is the most crucial agenda to move the country forward. Tunisia's
relationship with the IMF and World Bank has prevented transitional justice in Tunisia from
fully holding those accountable for past human rights abuses, in which the Truth and Dignity
Commission attempted to claim that the IMF and World Bank were responsible for monetary
reparations for the harm they've done; therefore, there is a conflict between democracy
promotion policy and transitional justice efforts in Tunisia. Political scientist Corinna Mullin
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critiques democracy promotion and its influence on transitional justice, arguing that transitional
justice is merely an extension of democracy promotion which works to ". . . [L]ock postcolonial
states within an unequal capitalist global economy so that they can continue to be sites of
speculative investment, and natural-resource and surplus-value extraction" (27)2. Mullin further
argues that democracy promotion theory emphasizes the importance of individual rights versus
collective rights. Therefore, if this were the case in Tunisia, we would see a strong emphasis on
individual rights and reparations throughout the transitional justice process coupled with
neoliberal economic reform.
Democracy promotion as an academic theory in political science argues as Linz and
Stepan pointed out, that democratic transitions must focus first on establishing political
institutions and then focus on economic reform. However, democracy promotion as a policy does
not follow this sequencing. Instead, its followers, such as the World Bank and IMF, advocate for
dramatic economic reform through privatization and neoliberalism while the transitioning
country is simultaneously undergoing a political transformation. The Tunisian government had
little choice but to follow this policy, they had been indebted to the IMF since the late 1950s, and
if they were to cut off this relationship, they would have to pay off all their debt. Also, the
Tunisian government led by political elites is dependent on foreign recognition and monetary
aid, which they believe is integral to moving the country forward through a unified government.
Therefore, there is a significant dichotomy between academic theory on democracy promotion
and its use in policymaking decisions. As political theorist Sheri Berman points out, democracy

2

Mullin, Corinna, Nada Trigui, and Azadeh Shahshahani. 2019. “Decolonizing Justice in
Tunisia: From Transitional Justice to a People’s Tribunal.” Monthly Review: An
Independent Socialist Magazine 71(1): 22–39.
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promotion as a foreign policy, particularly foreign policy from Western Nations such as the
United States, believe in a “shock approach” in which, “. . . [T]he key to democratization was the
removal of authoritarian elites standing in its way, after which the structures and institutions of
democracy would develop spontaneously out of desire of all peoples for freedom and self-rule”
(Berman 147)3. Therefore, democracy promotion does not seek to create strong institutions that
can support economic restricting or neoliberal policy; rather, policymakers misguidedly assume
that countries in transition will naturally form strong institutions in conjunction with economic
reform.
Tunisia’s transitional justice process follows an outdated approach to democratization
from the 1990s, emphasizing individual over collective rights by working to address violence or
human rights violations on an individual basis rather than working to disrupt systemic inequality
and human rights violations. This research will better inform democratization theory and
transitional justice committees on the role of economic inequality in democratic transition. It can
aid transitioning countries, whether current or in the future, particularly those in the Arab World
with a similar history to Tunisia. It can also help transitioning governments make the best
decisions for their country when struggling with conflicting pressure from organizations such as
the IMF and World Bank or human rights backed groups, such as the International Transitional
Justice Committee. Most importantly, this research will provide a human rights approach to
transition and democratization theory.

3

Berman, Sheri. “How Democracies Emerge.” In Debates on Democratization, eds. Larry
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Philip Costopoulos, 145-158. (Baltimore, MD: The John
Hopkins University Press, 2010.
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Democratization Theory
Democratization theorists are conflicted on the role market reform, and privatization
plays in countries undergoing a transition to democracy. Democracy promotion advocates from
the United States and European Union argue that once a country begins a transition, through the
removal of the authoritarian government, democratic institutions will arise, particularly if the
country focuses on rebuilding its economy and embracing neoliberal policies, such as
privatization. The same people 4believe that the country in transition’s main goal should be on
creating a prosperous government, with the support of Western organizations such as the IMF
and World Bank, and that the harmful remains of the authoritarian regime (economic inequality)
will disappear once the economy improves. In this paper, I will argue that this framework is
based on flawed assumptions since Tunisia's history of regional economic inequality has
continued to be a prominent issue throughout their transitional process and continues to be a
major factor in Tunisians' dissatisfaction with the government. While political scientists have
argued that economic shock therapy ultimately harms the democratization process, many
transitioning countries follow foreign powers' misguided advice and democratization policy.
Tunisia's choice to follow democratization policy, not theory, provides important insight into
why countries undertake political and economic reform and the role foreign democracy
promoters play in enforcing this decision.

4

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” In Debates on
Democratization, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Philip Costopoulos, 3-19.
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010.
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Post-Communist Lessons
The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition to democracy inspired Western
leaders to promote democracy in a diverse range of countries. This democracy promotion was
established out of the post-communist transition and argued that capitalism and democracy go
hand in hand. Thus, in order to promote democracy, Western powers, such as the United States
or European Union or their international banking institutions, must establish economic reform
that may even precede established political institutions. Post-communist literature finds that
countries that fared better economically, in the long run, were those that underwent rapid freemarket liberalization as opposed to countries that chose to establish democratic political
institutions while undergoing gradual economic liberalization. As a result, this literature
prompted democracy promoters to emphasize the need for free market liberalization even before
other democratic changes. This is illustrated through agreements between international financial
institutions and transitioning countries, such as Tunisia. In these agreements, the transitioning
country is required to implement swift economic reform in order to widen their private sector
and become more attractive to foreign investors. As a result, post-communist transitions illustrate
that elite cooperation means that economic reform will not be led by those who wish to create a
more equitable economy; instead, they will focus on establishing neoliberal reform. Thus,
showcasing that capitalism is integral to democracy promotion policy.
Literature on post-Soviet transitions5 explore the role of democracy promotion and
consolidation theory, finding that economic and political justice cannot occur in conjunction with

5

Solnick, Steven L. 1999. “Russia’s `Transition’: Is Democracy Delayed Democracy Denied?”
Social Research 66(3): 789–824.
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one another without impacting the future of democracy. This literature also explains that a focus
on consolidation of democracy and a transition enables the political elite to move from one
regime to another and that they can often take advantage of a transition by espousing democratic
ideals and the emphasis on a free election while allowing remnants of the authoritarian regime to
survive. Elite consensus theory further explains that the political elite from former regimes will
spur a transition by forming a consensus to implement neoliberal economic reform. Thus, this
research from post-soviet transitions, in particular studies of Russia, illustrate that
democratization does not simply result from a removal of the authoritarian regime and that
democracy promotion and consolidation theory often lead to neoliberal economic reform, which
in turn, distracts from creating meaningful and substantial democratic and institutional change.
However, the critique of this view of democratization has grown in recent years.6Critics,
such as political scientist Valerie Bunce, argue that transitioning countries cannot undergo
market reform or privatization while also reforming their institutions and political processes.
According to political scientist Valerie Bunce, this critique develops out of post-communist
democracy theory in which, after time passed, political scientists began to see the flaws in
upholding the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, as a model for democracy promotion.
This critique the view of western democratization organizations that emphasize that market
reform and liberalization will then lead to more democratic institutions, “The widely held view
that market reform and privatization can legitimate new democracies is based on the dubious
assumption that economic improvement can be achieved simultaneously with the installation and

6

Bunce, Valerie. 2003. "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Post-communist
Experience." World Politics 55(2): 167–92.
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legitimation of democratic institutions” (Linz and Stepan 17). Therefore, this view supports my
argument that Tunisia cannot expect that rampant economic inequality will be resolved through
austerity measures advocated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. My research
will also add to the growing literature that economic equality is a right, not a privilege, and thus,
that transitioning countries must address these issues head-on and not allow them to be left to
market-driven reforms (Arbour 2006).
Transitional Justice Theory
The Tunisian people have grappled with a long history of political violence, starting first
with France's colonial power and then later through the authoritarian regimes installed after their
independence. Similar to how a transition from colonialism to authoritarian rule did little to
address the Tunisian people's grievances, so too would a mere transition from revolution to
democracy. Thus, Tunisia needed to implement transitional justice to uphold the human rights of
its people, but also, to create a new future, they must address their past. Unfortunately,
transitional justice is not an overly simple process and depends on the country's political and
economic ability. Transitional justice groups can only create as meaningful of change as the
country will allow, and thus, often ends up as a relatively performative process whose fate rests
in the hands of the political elite and foreign democratic policy promoters who do not want its
emphasis on economic, human rights to interfere with their separate economic agenda. Thus,
transitional justice theory often conflicts with democracy promotion policy.
Transitional justice theory has developed throughout the past few decades as its use has
grown, and since there is more available data from early countries that completed transitional
justice, such as South Africa. A growing debate in transitional justice theory is the role social and
economic rights should play in its process. Transitional justice has formerly sided with policies
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advocated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank that argue that social and
economic rights will naturally come after the transitioning country strengthens the economy
(Arbour 2006). However, human rights groups have critiqued this theory, arguing that
transitional justice leaders should actively work to dismantle the existing structures that allow
and create violations of social and economic rights. Transitional justice must focus on economic
issues of inequality through a collective lens rather than an individual if it is used as a
mechanism to support democratization in a transitioning country; otherwise, it will do little to
disrupt the already existing systemic inequalities, adding to revolutionaries' distrust of substantial
change through democratization. However, while transitional justice groups may try to push for
more structural change to combat economic inequality, their wants will be overtaken and ignored
by elected leaders who are indebted to foreign democracy promoters and must implement
neoliberal economic reform that is often the antithesis of economic equality. Thus, in the case of
Tunisia, the Truth and Dignity Commission was unable to implement structural economic reform
while the government ignored their reports and passed economic reform that granted amnesty to
corrupt officials and raised the cost of living for the Tunisians the Truth and Dignity
Commission found in most need of reparations and reform.
International Understanding of Transitional Justice
Transitional justice may have only first begun to gain prominence in South Africa in the
1990s. However, it has drawn on past political struggles for democracy, particularly those after
the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc. Thus, transitional justice is also strongly impacted by the
West's infatuation with democracy promotion in former authoritarian regimes. Bush's words
clearly illustrate a newfound interest in democracy promotion but also the new view that
democracy and capitalism go hand in hand, something not exactly backed up by political
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scientists. Despite this critique of neoliberal democracy promotion, institutions such as the IMF
and World Bank espouse the notion that capitalism and creating a free market is the most
important step towards bringing democracy to former authoritarian regimes. As a result,
countries such as Tunisia that rely on Western banking institutions for necessary foreign aid must
implement neoliberal economic policies if they wish to receive any funding, even if this does not
necessarily bring about equality or democracy for all.
Transitional Justice in South Africa
Western countries and democracy promoters have regarded South Africa as the first
country to undertake transitional justice successfully. However, many Black South Africans have
complained that the process was performative and did little to mitigate existing inequities that
continue to impact them today. Therefore, South Africa is yet another example of the failure to
address economic inequality through a transition process. Analyses of transitional justice in
South Africa, a country often lauded for its adoption of a post-apartheid transitional justice
process, have critiqued the often-symbolic notion of justice found in this process. Although
South Africa is upheld as a successful transition that has undergone transitional justice,
particularly by Western groups such as the International Committee on Transitional Justice, the
country has failed to receive justice or create equality for a large majority of South Africans.
International Relations professor Leslie Vinjamuri critiques this process arguing, "Strategies for
dealing with the past are not only political by design, but they also have significant distributional
effects, delivering justice, truth or reconciliation for some and denying it from others. South
Africa's CommissionCommission was inevitably compromised, the vast majority of political
crimes remain unreported, and the majority black population has so far failed to reap the
economic benefits of transition" (Vinjamuri 2014). South Africa's transitional justice process
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was, as Vinjamuri refers to as "compromised" since its mandate purposely left out social and
economic rights, thus failing to address the historical inequities that excluded Black South
Africans from financial success, employment, and education. Similar to South Africa, Tunisia's
transitional justice process has been "compromised" in that its government has prevented it from
acting on economic rights violations. Therefore, South Africa and critique on its transitional
justice illustrate a warning for Tunisia—that transitional justice historically fails to promote
economic equality, particularly among historically marginalized groups.
Economic Rights
The former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour7,
argued in 2006 that transitional justice must address economic and structural inequality that
occurred not only under past regimes but prevent it from occurring yet again. Arbour contends
that the current understanding of transitional justice enables it to focus solely on past abuses that
clearly violate international law. However, this limited view, she argues, allows other abuses,
particularly those that violate economic, social, and cultural rights, to escape transitional justice,
meaning these victims do not get justice but also that these abuses can and often will continue
into the new regime. Arbour contributes this separation between economic and social rights with
political rights to two distinct human rights covenants in 1966—The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Arbour believes that this separation supports the notion that these human rights are not
linked and that one—civil and political rights—is not as important as the other. As a result,
economic rights can be separated from transitional justice, preventing its reach. In Tunisia’s case,

7

Arbour, Louise. “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition.” 40: 28.
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the Truth and Dignity Commission in charge of the transitional process wanted to pursue
economic rights. However, the government refused to provide reparations or structural change
and instead offered symbolic reparations and acknowledgment of infringements of economic
rights. The government refused to acknowledge the Truth and Dignity Commission's complaint
that the World Bank and IMF were responsible for economic rights violations. Thus, although
the Tunisian transitional justice process wished to include economic rights, the government at the
hands of western banking institutions refused to cooperate with this inclusion.
If transitional justice’s broader objectives of social transformation and the prevention of
conflict are to be achieved, it is not only important to build dispute resolution institutions and
ensure accountability for abuses but also—and perhaps even more importantly—to attack the
sources of legitimate grievances that, if political rights are intrinsically linked to violations of
economic, social and cultural rights, whether they are causes or consequences of the latter
(Arbour 8). Therefore, all human rights are intertwined and must be addressed in transitional
justice.
History of Economic Inequality in Tunisia
In order to contextualize Tunisia's current transitional justice and its economic inequality,
I will use chapters from the book The Arab Anomaly to understand the history of Tunisia's
economic policies since their freedom from French colonization. This literature will enable me to
understand better how Bourguiba and Ben Ali's authoritarian regimes created regional economic
inequality. This literature also explains the complacency of the IMF and World Bank have
played in perpetuating this inequality by enforcing austerity measures that enable the Tunisian
government to perpetuate economic inequality while simultaneously refusing to address this
inequality until democratization became a reality here. Ultimately, this will strengthen my
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argument by allowing me to trace the ways in which regional economic inequality has persisted
even throughout the transitional justice process and how economic inequality severely threatens
the continuation of democracy in Tunisia and must be addressed immediately.
Although almost anyone can start a revolution, in Tunisia's case a mere fruit vendor, the
subsequent political transition and the new regime's lasting success are often dependent on what
political scientists Higley and Burton call "the elite variable."8 Higley and Burton argue, "Stable
democratic regimes depend on heavily on the 'consensual unity' of national elites" (245). Thus,
according to this theory, the opposite can be true—unstable regimes result from a disunified
elite. Higley and Burton's theory is upheld in Tunisia—elites in Tunisia were split between two
main factions: Islamists and secularists. These warring political parties were at odds ever since
Tunisia's independence from France. However, after the 2011 revolution, these two political
groups were forced to work together to create a lasting democratic transition. After Ben Ali's
resignation in January of 2011, the Islamist party Ennahda won elections and formed a coalition
government with two secularist groups. Despite some tensions between these two groups, further
heightened by two secular politicians' assassination in 2013, these groups continued to work
together to establish a constitution and continue the country's transition to democracy. As a
result, in 2014, when the secularist group Nida Tounes won the election, they similarly formed a
consensus with Islamist groups. Thus, this elite consensus enabled Tunisia's government to
continue with its democratic transition; however, it also meant that compromise could undermine
some of the revolution's most pressing issues.

8

Higley, John, and Michael G. Burton. 2012. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and
Breakdowns [1989].” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 37(1
(139)): 245–68.
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After the removal of Ben Ali in 2011 and the subsequent revolution, the country was
thrown into turmoil, with no clear path to democracy, thus, preventing transitional justice from
taking place until things settled down. The first pathway towards democracy in Tunisia began in
January of 2011 when the country, led by the coalition between the Islamic Ennahda party and
two secular parties were tasked with forming an interim government and a constitution that could
create a sense of normalcy and transition towards a democratic government chosen by the
people. In September of 2013, Ennahda formally transitioned power to the interim government
formed by the renowned Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, and the country becomes one step
closer to addressing its past. As a result, transitional justice was not formally established until
December 2013, two years after Ben Ali's removal, under the Organic Law on Establishing and
Organizing Transitional Justice. Ultimately, transitional justice did not begin in Tunisia until the
spring of 2014, when members of the newly formed Truth and Dignity Commission were elected
at the General Assembly of the National Constituent. In October of 2014, the Truth and Dignity
Commission teams up with the International Transitional Justice Committee to receive
international guidance; however, the process is still dictated by Tunisian elected officials.
Role of International Financial Institutions
The IMF and World Bank, the world’s most prominent international financial institutions
that grant economic support and guidance to developing countries, have tightly clung to the
belief that democracy cannot exist without a free-market economy and that this must precede
other democratic institution building. These institutions not only argue that transitioning
countries must embrace capitalism, they argue that the free-market economy and other neoliberal
policy changes must come first, since democracy, they argue, cannot exist without first a freemarket. This line of thinking is upheld by the United States and the European Union through
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their democracy promotion; however, yet again, it does not reflect the significant critique from
the political science community. Both the World Bank and IMF signaled support for democracy
in Tunisia by supporting the G-8 Action on the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in
Transition in 2011, which focused on economically assisting transitioning countries on their path
to democratization. This partnership reflected democracy promotion theory in arguing for the
implementation of neoliberal reform at the very beginning of the transition to democracy. Thus,
these institutions do not reflect the dialogue and immense research from political scientists who
have begun to seriously doubt the theory and implications behind deeming democracy and
capitalism mutually exclusive. Rather, these institutions, similar to the democracy promotion
groups in the West, act out of their own interest. Political scientist Milja Kurki explains this selfinterest, ". . . [M]any international financial organizations have increasingly sought to expand the
sphere of market economies of states to capitalist-economies and liberal democratization have
been treated as conjoined agendas" (122). Therefore, Kurki points out that despite a growing
fracture between capitalism and democracy, international financial institutions continue to strive
towards increasing their capitalist influence across the world.
Tunisia’s relationship with Financial Institutions
In 1956, Tunisia escaped the long-held grasp of colonial power France, gaining
independence after a four-year struggle. However, shortly after, in 1958, under President
Bourguiba, Tunisia joined with another colonial power, the International Monetary Fund. By
joining the IMF, Bourguiba not only wished to gain international aid to help a newly formed
Tunisia left marred by France, but he also wished to gain Western support and approval by
signifying that he wanted to work with them. Almost thirty years after joining the IMF, in 1986,
Tunisia signed a structural adjustment package that would significantly shift the future of the
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economy and Tunisians' lives. This structural adjustment policy emphasized the need for private
sector growth in Tunisia, stripping away food and energy subsidies many impoverished
Tunisians in the interior region relied on for survival. As a result, this policy hurt the interior
regions while aiding the already wealthy coast. Thus, further dividing the two regions and paving
the way for the economic inequality that would spur the revolution.
This economic inequality was further solidified through decades of IMF loans and
authoritarian rule, leading up to the 2011 Revolution. Interestingly enough, the very things that
the revolutionaries in the interior region demanded—basic economic rights—were supported by
decades of neoliberal policies enforced by Western Financial Institutions. Larbi Sadiki9 explains
that revolutionary Tunisians’ in the interior regions wanted equitable distribution of resources
and employment opportunities and were angered by their high levels of poverty, at around 2632% in comparison to 8% in the coastal region (2).
The Tunisian government had little choice but to implement neoliberal reforms—their
debt to the IMF and World Bank make it nearly impossible to disobey—as of 2018, their debt to
the IMF made up over 60% of their GDP. Therefore, the democratically elected government had
little choice. Those who were elected were the political elite from the coastal area who had
benefited from the former relationship with the IMF. Like many transitioning countries, Tunisia
has been indebted to the IMF and World Bank under the guise of democracy promotion through
improving the economy. Tunisia's relationship with the IMF and World Bank began in the late
1950s since Bourguiba saw this as a way for the country to gain foreign acceptance after their
independence from France. Under this current relationship, the Tunisian government must

9

Sadiki, Larbi. “Regional Development in Tunisia: The Consequences of Multiple
Marginalization.”: 15.
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decrease their public sector and enact free-market policies if they wish to continue to receive
funding from the IMF and World Bank. The IMF and World Bank enforce stringent attachments
to their aid, requiring the donor country to transition to a capitalist economy. However, these
attachments also require the donor country to dismantle some of the most atrocious democratic
violations, in Tunisia's case dealing with political corruption. Although these financial
institutions claim to act as promoters of democracy, they have worked with many countries
under authoritarian regimes, such as Tunisia. Only after democracy became popular, they began
to act as democracy promoters. For example, the IMF and World Bank have worked in Tunisia
for decades of their authoritarian rule, enforcing a free-market economy while turning a blind
eye to egregious human rights violations and economic inequality.
There was a significant discord between what the revolutionaries wanted—an equitable
economic system—and the neoliberal system required by the IMF and World Bank. Therefore, if
the Tunisian revolution were to address the needs of those who started the revolution fully, the
government would not have continued its similar relationship with these Western banks.
However, as mentioned earlier, the Tunisian revolution was overtaken by the coastal elite who
benefited from these neoliberal policies and relied on their aid; thus, the newly formed Tunisian
government continued its relationship with the IMF and World Bank. The democratically elected
elite had no ability to sever their ties with these banking institutions. Still, they were also part of
the small group in Tunisia that was barely impacted by these neoliberal economic reforms since
the former regime had directed all investment and development into their region. Instead, these
political elite were most worried about establishing a respected position in Western Society; thus,
they embraced neoliberal reform that would solidify their position in the global economic order.
The IMF and World Bank were more than happy to continue their relationship with Tunisia after
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the revolution; however, they had to adjust their policies, or at least appear to adjust them, to
emphasize democratic changes. This change was illustrated through the G-8 Act on the Deauville
Partnership with Arab Countries in transition in which western financial institutions and
countries agreed to aid countries emerging successfully from the Arab Spring through
"stabilization, job creation, participation, governance, and integration." The World Bank
reflected a similar sentiment after their 2012 agreement with Tunisia in which they claimed they
were focused on "social and economic inclusion" and "voice, transparency, and accountability."
However, as political scientist Hanieh points out, this shift was more performative rather than
literal as the World Bank continued to enforce privatization and other neoliberal policies.
The Truth and Dignity Commission
The elected officials on the Truth and Dignity Commission were separate from other
Tunisian politicians and were solely in charge of the transitional justice process, creating a
dichotomy between the Truth and Dignity Commission and other Tunisian politicians. This
dichotomy was initially positive. It would enable the Truth and Dignity Commission to operate
without political motives; however, this meant that they could not implement anything other than
performative acknowledgments and hearings without the Tunisian government's full monetary
and legal support. Thus, this aspect of transitional justice in Tunisia meant that the government
was not responsible for implementing suggestions it did not wish to undertake. In November
2016, the Truth and Dignity Commission began formal public hearings in which they listened to
human rights abuses of women in prison.
Over the next four years, the Truth and Dignity Commission steadfastly worked to locate
and identify human rights abuses the past seventy years while also working to promote equitable
change for the future of Tunisia. Despite this dedication, the Truth and Dignity Commission's
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work did not flow seamlessly; instead, it was marred by interference with the Tunisian
government, security forces, and even the International Center for Transitional Justice—a body
that agreed to remain neutral. This interference prevented the Truth and Dignity Commission's
ability to create change since the International Center for Transitional Justice fueled foreign and
public distrust of the process, enabling the government to reject their suggestions somewhat
reasonably. The Truth and Dignity Commission was unsurprised but disappointed in the
President and Parliament's actions to undermine the transitional justice process since it could
threaten their political motives. However, they expressed the most dismay with the International
Committee for Transitional Justice actions, which were meant to aid the process, not undermine
it. The Executive Summary out of the Truth and Dignity Commission expressed their frustration
with the International Committee for Transitional Justice (ICTJ):
. . . [S]ince early 2017, ICTJ country office changed its policy vis-à-vis TDC, as
evidenced by the many attempts to interfere with the affairs of the TDC and the attempts
to influence its decisions and simmer internal conflicts. Once those conflicts were
overcome, the ICTJ Country Director started to play the victims off against TDC and to
act as if the Center were a parallel Truth and Dignity Commission. ITCJ became involved
in the campaigns aimed to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the TDC, while the campaigns
to support the Draft Law on Administrative Reconciliation were underway in September
2017. Moreover, in a statement to the press agencies, ICTJ accused the TDC of failing to
fulfill its mandate (2019).
Although the Truth and Dignity Commission did not specify the ways in which the ICTJ tried to
interfere with internal affairs, they were obviously significant since they “severed relations” with
the ICTJ not long after.
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Despite this severed relationship with the ICTJ, the Truth and Dignity Commission
continues its work to expose human rights abuses and promote a meaningful transition to
democracy. After its close in December of 2018, the Truth and Dignity Commission released an
over 600-page report detailing their process, the many cases of abuse they found, and their
recommendations, which cannot be implemented without the financial backing of the Tunisian
government. The Truth and Dignity Commission concluded its work by acknowledging the
systemic and regional inequalities; however, they only called for symbolic reparations,
individual monetary reparations, or development, reflecting the individualistic practice of
democracy promotion.
Although the Truth and Dignity Report specifically highlighted regions that have been
systemically and historically marginalized, their findings refrain from victimizing the entire
region, rather specific individuals who come forward with complaints. This individualistic
approach was challenged in 2017 when the Regional Labor Union of Siliana submitted a
collective complaint stating that the government further harmed the region by its handling of
protests and did little to address the region's increasing inequality. The CommissionCommission
acknowledged that there had been wrongdoing but only recommended symbolic reparations,
failing to create lasting change. The Commission initially expressed strong support in providing
monetary reparations and economic restructuring to address economic rights; however, the
Tunisian government interfered with their process through neoliberal economic reform and
refused to hold the IMF and World Bank responsible. Thus, despite being given the opportunity
to acknowledge and promote collective reparations to address one of the most pressing
concerns—regional inequalities—the CommissionCommission had little choice but to stick to
the status quo.
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The refusal to call for collective reparations to dismantle the structures of inequality that
enabled these historically marginalized regions to continue to worsen reflects the neoliberal
democratic model that relies on individualism, as seen through the Commission'sCommission's
call for individual reparations, as well as through their call for development.
Thus, although the Truth and Dignity Commission may not claim to espouse capitalistic ideas of
democracy, their call for development reflects this notion.
Role of the Political Elite in the Transition
While the IMF and World Bank pressured Tunisia to adopt economic liberalization under
authoritarian rule, the coastal elite got wealthier. Simultaneously, the interior region suffered,
creating an even further divide between the two regions. Writer Safwan Masri argues that Ben
Ali’s relationship with the IMF and their subsequent economic improvements were not
distributed equitably; instead, they benefited only the upper classes of the coast as agricultural
economic policy favored the coast, directing all public investment there. On the other hand, the
interior regions experienced poverty rates as high as 30%10. This divide and the government's
hand in furthering this inequity prompted the interior region to become engulfed in a revolution.
The revolutionary demands of the south and coast are often simplified and grouped together as a
call for democracy; however, this oversimplification fails to recognize the disparities between
the two regions and the fact that a call for democratic transition did not begin until protests
reached the coast. Similarly, it is crucial to note that revolutionary demands in both regions were
shaped by different backgrounds, actors, and the ever-growing socioeconomic disparity between
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the south and the prosperous coast. Bouazizi's self-immolation was not a call for democracy; it
was a call for southern recognition and the opportunity to work and make a living wage. The
preceding protests in Tunisia's interior were against the region's socioeconomic corruption and
marginalization, and their goals are often summed up as a call for work, freedom, and national
dignity. Once the revolution spread up the coast, the interior region's message soon became
overtaken by revolutionists on the coast, who began to call for political change and, thus, the
removal of Ben Ali. Unlike the revolution in the south, which young unemployed graduates led,
the coast's revolutionary demands were led by civil society, opposition parties, and political
elites who believed that they would significantly benefit from a democratic transition. Soon, the
revolutionary message was overtaken by the coastal political elites who would lead the coming
democratic transition, and in turn, the southern revolutionaries lost not only their message but
also their influence in the ongoing political transition.
It is crucial to understand the implications the coastal elite had in Tunisia’s revolution
and subsequent transition to democracy since they have largely remained in control of the
government and the transition process. Tunisia was able to transition to democracy through an
elite consensus of both Islamists and Secularists who formed a coalition to create a democratic
state. This coalition was primarily made up of former politicians under the past authoritarian rule
since they had previous political experience and therefore organized enough to win a majority of
the seats11In an interview with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the former
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president of the constitutional reform body quoted, "The current majority of the coalition is
increasingly implicated in the return of the anciens and blatant forms of corruption."10 Thus, the
post-revolutionary electoral process has meant that the political elite would play a larger role in
the government formation than the less organized and economically disadvantaged
revolutionaries from the interior. The coastal elite, who benefited from the neoliberal policies of
the IMF and the World Bank under authoritarian rule, have continued to embrace these policies
while turning a blind eye to the revolutionary demands of the south, which still remain
unanswered. Once a catalyst for the revolution, the Tunisian General Labor Union has led
current nationwide strikes after the IMF and World Bank have required Tunisia to freeze public
sector wages.12The Tunisian government has condemned these protests and continued to follow
the guidance of the persistent banking institutions. While the economic agenda in Tunisia is led
by the IMF and World Bank, it is not coincidental that their policy is also bolstered by the
coastal elite. It is an economic agenda that benefits both parties involved, "Recognizing the
existence of plurality of different accounts of how democracy and capitalism inter-relate is
important because it prompts us to question the justifications given for capitalist democracy
promotion and reminds us that the promotion of capitalist democracy is not 'natural' but a very
specific political and economic project (Kurki 123). Thus, as Kurki points out, democracy
promotion through capitalism is not justifiable without first considering how this agenda benefits
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those upholding this agenda, in Tunisia's case, Western financial institutions and the political
elite.
It has been almost a decade since the revolution, which, to be fair, is not a significantly
long time after a political upheaval; however, who has been in charge of the political process
during this time can still have a profound impact on the country's future. During this time,
Tunisia has had two presidential elections by the people—Beji Caid Essebsi in December of
2014 and Kais Saied in September of 2019. Despite being elected after Ben Ali's removal,
Essebsi had close ties with the authoritarian Bourguiba administration and thus represented both
the political and coastal elite. On the other hand, Tunisia's current president, Saied, is the first
president not to have ties from past authoritarian regimes and remained largely apolitical, thus
not representing the political elite; however, he does represent the academic elite of the coast.
Despite only holding two presidential elections by the people, three other presidents
helped lead the transition. The first, Fouad Mebazza, was selected by the Constitutional Council
to serve as interim president in January of 2011until they were able to draft a new constitution
and hold elections. The second, Moncef Marzouki, was elected in December 2011 by the
Tunisian Constituent Assembly. Marzouki was elected by the Constitutional Council, a
democratically elected body made up of 217 Tunisian politicians tasked with forming the new
constitution. This group was led by a consensus between three different political parties, one
Islamist, Ennahda, and the other two secularist-Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol. While
drafting a constitution, the Constituent Assembly also worked towards addressing past abuses by
freeing those imprisoned during the revolution and by generating a National Dialogue on
Transitional Justice that would ultimately lead to the drafting of the Transitional Justice Law that
was passed in December of 2013. After Marzouki, Tunisia was finally able to have a presidential
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election through mass suffrage, electing Essebsi. However, Essebsi died while in office in July of
2019, causing Mohamed Ennaceur, President of the Assembly of the Representatives of the
People, to step in until they could hold formal presidential elections. Although they represented a
range of political parties, all of these men had one thing in common—they are from the wealthy
coast. Therefore, the revolution was not only taken over by the coastal elite; they have continued
to lead its transition.
The Tunisian government, even with each new election, has continued to remain hostile
towards transitional justice. In part, this hostility is because the Tunisian government must figure
out how to deal with the past while also creating a future in a completely different direction.
However, this hostility can also be explained by the political leaders' close ties to the former
regime, meaning transitional justice. An in-depth look and accountability to their past actions
could harm their political careers. These politicians are also tied up with the IMF and World
Bank, who, although on paper may support transitional justice, advocate for free-market reforms
over the human rights of transitional justice. As a result, Tunisia's transitional justice process has
been significantly harmed by their government's lack of support.
Government Interference with Transitional Justice in Tunisia
The Tunisian government has somewhat obviously harmed the transitional justice
process. As political scientist Shannon Green for the Center for Strategic and International
Studies Think Tank explains, “challenges were part of a government-managed strategy to
undermine the TDC’s work.” Green argues that two main challenges to the transitional justice
process are first, the Tunisian government's refusal to provide promised access to presidential
records that could be used to study further and prove the past regime's widespread abuses, and
secondly, the Economic Reconciliation Law that grants amnesty to former corrupt elite. Green
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continues to argue that these two challenges can significantly impact transitional justice by
refusing them the ability to study and prosecute those engaged in corruption. Similarly, she
argues that it enables these issues to continue and that economic elites do not have to account for
the harm they created adequately. These challenges are supported by Tunisian politicians, such
as Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Ennahda, who in 2013, before the passage of transitional
justice law, argued that he believes that Tunisia must move on from their past and instead work
towards creating a better economy that will attract foreign investors. Thus, Green thinks that the
Tunisian government played a role in preventing the scope of the transitional justice process in
Tunisia and its ability to address economic rights adequately. This argument falls in line with
that of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as well as post-communist theories.
Although the Truth and Dignity Commission was established as an independent body,
their power rests in the Tunisian government's hands who is simultaneously indebted to the
World Bank and IMF. The Truth and Dignity Commission not only relies on government
documents and credentials to investigate past abuses, but they also depend on the Tunisian
government for financial backing. For example, the Tunisian government supplies the money for
reparations under transitional justice. The Tunisian government originally set aside about ten
million dinars, equivalent to $3,700,000; however, this is not enough to address collective
reparations for oppressed regions and has yet to reach any victims.13This becomes even more
complex when the Truth and Dignity Commission called on France, the IMF, and the World
Bank to pay reparations to the Tunisian people for the harms they committed through
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colonialism under France and aggressive, free-market reforms that hurt the most vulnerable
populations. However, this is almost impossible to be upheld since the Tunisian government is
led by economic elites who have signaled a desire to advance their privatization and foreign
investment, in which a good relationship with France is required. Similarly, they are dependent
on the IMF and World Bank for money and loan forgiveness. As a result, the Truth and Dignity
Commission cannot fulfill its mission to root out systemic economic inequality both past and
present.
Role of Elite in Transitions and Consensus Building
The Role of Western Banking in Tunisia
The IMF and World Bank did almost nothing to mitigate the economic inequality they
have caused throughout their relationship with Tunisia. Since transitional justice often excludes
economic rights, they could escape unscathed. Instead, they were able to play a significant role in
shaping Tunisia's future, some critics even going so far as to argue that most economic policy out
of Tunisia is controlled by these institutions and the Tunisian government can do little since their
debt to these banks only grows. Under this critique, this unequal relationship mirrors colonial
Tunisia—indebted and dependent on a foreign body with little political say. As mentioned
earlier, these institutions are aware of this mistrust between themselves and the Arab countries;
however, any action to change this has been merely performative. However, Tunisians are well
aware of this performativity and continue to protest these economic policies. For example, one of
the most controversial economic policies that spurred significant protest and unrest was the
Finance Law of 2018. This law increased the value-added tax by 1%, impacting health services,
medicines, restaurants, and professional services, without considering each person's income. As a
result, this law further harmed those already struggling with the new high cost of living that is

Silberhorn 32
exacerbated through tax increases on electricity, gas, and oil coupled with a decrease in public
subsidies and wage freezes. Along with this, many critics of this law believe that the IMF and
World Bank were the masterminds behind this law and that the Tunisian government had very
little negotiating power. One Tunisian activist illustrated the dichotomy between their country's
relationship with international financial institutions and the revolution, "IFI loans and its
associated debt were, in the words of one Tunisian activist, 'not a secondary question to the
ongoing social struggles confronting the current Tunisian revolution, but at the heart of the
struggle, raising economic, political and social questions that relate to popular sovereignty and
foreign control, and how we divide the wealth of the country and achieve rights for all
Tunisians'" (Hanieh 120). Thus, many Tunisians believe that their economic rights hinge on their
country's relationship with these institutions.
Conclusion
The revolution in Tunisia was started by a want for fundamental economic and human
rights. It is a want that every human being deserves and that each governing body—whether it be
a transitioning country such as Tunisia, a foreign one such as the United States, or an economic
entity such as the World Bank—must uphold or endure the consequences of violating
international human rights. Tunisia occupies a painful position, haunted by the pain caused by
the former regime while filled with hope for a country that can escape the colonial and
capitalistic grasp of foreign powers that wish to dictate their country's future. While there has
been a great change since Tunisia's revolution in 2011, the political elite and Western Banking
Institutions continue to play a role both pre-revolution and after. They have co-opted the
revolution to advance their own economic agenda and, in turn, have undermined and
delegitimatized the reach of human rights in the transitional justice process. The role of the
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political elite in Tunisia played a significant role in enabling both economic and political
restructuring to occur simultaneously; however, the IMF and World Bank bear the responsibility
for forcing Tunisia to ignore democratic theory and implement economic reform through a shock
approach at the expense of the transitional justice process and its work on economic rights
violations. This finding illustrates that Tunisia, like other developing countries, has been taken
advantage of by Western powers, threatening the fate of their revolution and the livelihood of
their people.
Tunisia serves as yet another warning to the dangers of foreign powers and the elite and
their creation of policy that does not first address the most atrocious human rights violations.
Academic theory on democratization stresses the importance of establishing strong political
institutions, public trust, and in regard to human rights, collective reparations to those suffering
the most. On the other hand, democracy promotion policy enforced by institutions such as the
IMF and World Bank ignore this theory and instead pursue economic reform that benefits
themselves. These foreign powers and the elite do not represent the Tunisian revolution—they
represent a continuation of colonial control. Transitional justice and human rights groups should
not have to deal with the interference of foreign bodies or elites; instead, countries such as
Tunisia should be able to hold these groups responsible for the inequitable environment they
have created.
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